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Abstract 
In recent years, England and Wales have suffered droughts. This unusual situation defies the common belief that 
the British climate provides abundant water resources and has prompted the regulatory authorities to impose 
bans on superfluous uses of water. Furthermore, a large percentage of households in England consume 
unmetered water which is detrimental to water saving efforts. Given this context, we estimate the shadow price 
of water using a panel data from reports published by the Office of Water Services (Ofwat) for the period 1996 
to 2010 (three regulatory periods). These shadow prices are derived from a parametric multi-output multi-input 
input distance function characterized by a translog technology.  Following O'Donnell and Coelli (2005), we use a 
Bayesian econometric framework in order to impose regularity – monotonicity and curvature – conditions on a 
high-flexible technology. Consequently, our results can be interpreted at the firm level without requiring the 
need to base analysis on the averages.  Our estimations offer guidance for regulation purposes and provide an 
assessment of how the water supply companies deal with water losses under each regulatory period. The 
relevance of the study is quite general as water scarcity is a problem that will become more important with 
population growth and the impact of climate change. 
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1. Introduction 
According to the UN fact sheet about water, 1.8 billion people will be living in 
countries with absolute water scarcity and two-thirds of the world’s population could be under 
stress conditions in 2025. Furthermore, severe weather fluctuations between droughts and wet 
periods are not only affecting regions where these problems are prevalent but also nations like 
the United Kingdom (UK), that traditionally have been perceived as rainy countries with 
abundant water resources. In particular between the years 2010 to 2012, the UK suffered a 
harsh drought that prompted the regulatory authorities to impose bans on superfluous uses of 
water. Conversely, the winter season that ended in 2014 has been the wettest since 17661. 
Extreme weather conditions jeopardize continuity of supply. Therefore, it is essential that 
regulators incentivize an efficient use of water resources. England and Wales have the 
additional complication that only a small percentage of households have metered water 
services. Most of the customers pay a fixed amount according to the rateable value of their 
property. This feature discourages efforts to save water from both consumers and companies.     
In this study we estimate the shadow price of water, which is the implicit value 
assigned by the companies to this precious resource. The computation of shadow prices 
provides valuable information in the context of non-marketable goods and in particular for the 
internalization of negative externalities. According to Dang and Mourougane (2014), an 
accurate measure of shadow prices could help policymakers in three ways: (1) regulators 
could compare the private cost of internalizing the externalities with the marginal benefits of 
the environmental protection before determining the regulatory scheme; (2) they can be used 
as a reference point or benchmark to set penalties or taxes for not complying with the 
environmental targets and (3) shadow prices are useful for adjusting gross domestic product 
and productivity indexes used in long-term analysis. Furthermore, comparing shadow prices 
of non-marketable goods with prices of similar marketable goods (e.g. van Soest, List and 
Jeppesen, 2006; Fare, Grosskopf, Noh and Weber, 2005) provide insight about the current 
incentive structure of the industry. In our context, the shadow price of water can be compared 
to the prices charged per cubic meter of water delivered (for metered households) to 
determine if water suppliers have appropriate incentivize to increase profits by reducing 
leakage. However, given strong regulatory incentives to improve cost-efficiency, water 
                                                          
1 Met Office website: http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/news/releases/archive/2014/early-winter-stats. Accessed 
April, 23, 2014.  
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suppliers might also forgo costly leakage reduction efforts in order to avoid being penalized 
for not achieving cost efficiency targets.     
In our study, shadow prices are estimated using the Bayesian econometric methodology 
proposed by O’Donnell and Coelli (2005). The first step is the calculation of an input distance 
function with a translog functional form that complies with homogeneity, monotonicity and 
curvature restrictions. Afterwards the shadow prices are computed and analysed. As discussed 
below, the selected approach follows the trend in the literature of treating a bad output as an 
input, which is more intuitive, if we consider the trade-off between a negative externality and 
investment in environmental friendly technologies and practices.  
The panel data used in the analysis came from reports published by the Office of 
Water Services (Ofwat) for the period 1996 to 2010  and covers three regulatory periods 
(1996-2000, 2001-2005 and 2006-2010). In addition to the inputs and outputs, we control for 
other factors such as water quality, pressure, water source, unmetered households and whether 
the company is also engaged in sewerage related activities. 
The paper has five sections in addition to the introduction. In the second section, we 
provide a brief background of the problem and the literature. The third section contains an 
explanation of the chosen methodology. The analysed dataset is described in the fourth 
section of the paper. We discuss the results in the fifth section and state our conclusions in the 
sixth. 
2. Background 
The water sector is considered a network industry. Shy(2001) indicated four 
characteristics of a network industry: 1) it provides a system (individual parts of the product 
or service do not satisfy customers’ needs); 2) it produces network externalities; 3) there are 
switching costs and lock-in and 4) the production displays significant economies of scale. 
Such network industry features create entry barriers that foster the formation of natural 
monopolies. The presence of natural monopoly suggests efficiencies in production by a single 
monopoly firm, and traditionally, water along with most utility sectors was treated 
accordingly, with two main policy solutions.  One solution is the public provision of the 
goods or services required by society. The other solution is allowing private firms to satisfy 
the market’s needs while keeping these firms heavily regulated to prevent abuse of the firms’ 
monopoly power.  
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In the past 30 years, the tendency followed by governmental authorities is the 
privatisation of network industries, coupled with the vertical separation of a regulated natural 
monopoly network from potentially competitive upstream and downstream components.  
Thus, this approach has been applied in the UK, with varying degrees of success, in the rail, 
electricity, gas, and telecoms sector.  In contrast, when the water and sewerage sector of 
England and Wales, was privatized in 1989, no attempt was made to introduce competition, 
and no vertical restructuring occurred.  This was because it was generally accepted that 
considerable cost economies accruing from economics of scale and scope, thereby   favouring 
a single integrated natural monopoly provider.2 Thus, the main goal of UK water privatization 
was to improve the performance of the industry by providing improved incentives for cost 
efficiency via the implementation of price cap regulation (DOE, 1986). This decision has 
inspired several studies about the effectiveness of privatization and price cap regulation in 
these regions (Saal & Parker, 2000, 2001; Saal, Parker & Weyman-Jones, 2007; Bottasso & 
Conti, 2009a). The results of these studies show that privatization and the introduction of 
price cap regulation failed to robustly deliver the expected results and may have created 
incentives for opportunistic behaviour with respect to the cost cutting activities.  
UK water privatization also had an important effect on quality, and was also partially 
motivated to facilitate private investment flows needed to improve the quality of service, 
which had suffered from underinvestment before privatisation (Saal & Parker, 2001)  
However, as there is a well known trade-off between producing quality goods and services 
and seeking cost-efficiency, the English and Welsh water regulator also modified  the 
conventional price cap regime in order to counterbalance the tendency of neglecting quality. 
Specifically, a Q factor was included in the price cap formula for encouraging capital 
investment to comply with higher quality standards. Previous research suggests that this 
alteration implied a lax application of regulation in the first years after privatization and 
apparently an overinvestment in capital by the regulated firms (See Saal et al. 2007).  
Moreover, regulators primarily concentrated their efforts on the chemical properties of 
the water delivered, and customer observable characteristics such as customer pressure and 
call waiting times for customer service. Thus, the verification of the compliance of water 
                                                          
2 Recently the Water Service Regulation Authority (Ofwat) has promoted efforts towards introducing 
competition in the retail provision of water supply in England and Wales, with such competition first being 
allowed in April 2017 for business customers only, but not for households.  However, the extent of perceived 
cost benefits from natural monopoly benefit is still evident, as the new market structure will see water retailers 
simply reselling outputs provided by fully integrated and regulated wholesale services, who will provide all 
services except retail billing, account handling, metering, customer queries, and provision of water efficiency 
advice to consumers. Moreover, this reform falls well after the end of our sample period.   
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quality standards is performed by the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) in England and 
Wales. In 2012, this entity published several reports addressing the quality standards for these 
regions in 2011. This documents show that water quality standards have improved since 1991. 
In letters addressed to the Ministers of England and Wales it was stated that in 2011 
“[c]ompliance with the EU Drinking Water Directive for England and Wales combined was 
the same as the previous year at 99.96% with only 0.04% of 1.9 million tests failing to meet 
one of the chemical or microbiological standards”3. Similarly, the customer observable 
characteristics of water supply monitored by Ofwat, have also shown considerable 
improvement since privatisation.  
However, given increasing concerns with regard to water scarcity, it is notable that 
water losses4 have not received the same degree of attention since privatisation. There have 
been some efforts to address this problem (i.e. mandatory targets in 1997) but the 
implemented mandatory policies were later relaxed when the situation that triggered the 
policy change improved. Nevertheless, there is a confluence of factors that makes water losses 
permanently relevant in England and Wales. First, the regions of England and Wales have 
suffered from droughts recently. According to the data included in the HadUKP UK 
Precipitation Dataset, 2011 was one of the driest years in England. The Met Office annual 
report state that East Anglia and Lincolnshire underwent severe drought only comparable to 
what happened in 1921 (Met Office, 2012). The beginning of 2012 followed the same trend as 
in 2011 prompting some water companies to impose a hosepipe ban in early April (The 
Guardian, 2012).  After record precipitation during the following months, (e.g. April 2012 
was the wettest month since the authorities started keeping records) the hosepipe ban was 
lifted by all companies in July 2012. However, some companies caution that the threat of dry 
winters is not over (BBC, 2012). In addition, 2006, 2011 and 1999 presented the highest 
yearly average temperatures recorded in central England since they started being registered in 
1659 according to the Hadley Centre Central England Temperature (HadCET) dataset. 
Studying the reasons behind this “climate change” go beyond the scope of this study. We will 
simply assume as an accurate assessment of reality that for some reason the levels of 
precipitation are declining and that temperatures are rising.   
                                                          
3 Letter addressed to John Griffiths AM, Minister for the Environment and Sustainability from the Drinking 
Water Inspectorate DWI on July 3rd, 2012. The letter was published in the website of DWI.  
http://dwi.defra.gov.uk/about/annual-report/2011/letter-wales.pdf accessed on September 7th, 2012.  
4 Water losses or water leakage is defined as the water lost in the distribution process excluding losses within 
costumers’ premises. 
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Moreover, despite the seriousness of extreme weather events, leakage remains a 
problem in the UK, and is very high by international standards. Figure 1 illustrates the 
percentage of leakage with respect to the total water distributed from 1996 to 2010. This 
timespan covers three regulatory periods (1996-2000, 2001-2005 and 2006-2010). There was 
only a substantial reduction of water leakage in the first regulatory period, and this was due to 
the imposition of stringent mandatory targets to water companies by the authorities. This 
decision was a consequence of a severe drought in 1995 (Office of Water Services, 2000) and 
was not continued after the first four years of application. Eventually the measure was 
replaced by the sustainable economic level of leakage (SELL) which requires “the water 
companies to fix leaks, as long as the cost of doing so is less than the cost of not fixing the 
leak;”5  a decision that has not produced the same level of leakage reduction. Figure 1 also 
reveals that companies that only produce water (Water only companies, WoCs) had a much 
lower level of leakage than companies that also handle sewerage services (Water and 
sewerage companies, WaSCs). Thus, despite, privatisation, the imposition of price cap 
regulation, and considerable efforts to improve the quality of water services, water losses 
continues to be high, and this situation has not prompted an enduring regulatory response.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 
The potential ability to meet the challenge of increasing water scarcity is not only 
restricted by issues on the supply side but also relates to demand side issues. Projections for 
England and Wales elaborated by the Office of National Statistics suggest significant 
increases in population in coming years. Thus, the combined population of England and 
Wales is estimated to increase from 56.1 million people in 2012 to 64.4 million in 2032. The 
population would increase 14.8% in 20 years, on average 0.7% per year (Office of National 
Statistics, 2012). Therefore, water companies face not only increased potential for droughts 
but also increasing population demand.  To complicate things even further a large percentage 
of the English and Welsh households are not metered. According to the Position Statement of 
the Environmental Agency (2011), the average percentage of metered households in England 
and Wales is 35%. Hence, most of the customers do not pay for any water losses in their 
premises, and generally have little to no incentive to reduce water usage. 
The UK is, of course, not the only country facing pressure to reduce water losses. 
Other countries are dealing with similar issues. Nevertheless, we have found very few papers 
                                                          
5 Ofwat, http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/households/supply-and-standards/leakage/ accessed on August 20th, 2016.  
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analyzing water losses from an economic perspective. Garcia and Thomas (2001) and 
Martins, Coelho and Fortunato (2012) are two research articles that study the issue of water 
losses for France and Portugal respectively. Both papers treat water losses as a “bad output.”  
The idea behind this decision is that there is an economic trade-off between repairing a leak 
and delivering more water.  Garcia and Thomas (2001) explained that when a utility is dealing 
with a demand increase it has two options: 1) It could fix the leaks or 2) it could simply input 
more water into the distribution system to allow it to meet consumer water demand. Fixing 
leakage might require higher costs than increasing distribution input. Moreover, the larger the 
demand the smaller is the leakage because of the inverse relationship between demand and 
water pressure. Therefore, Garcia and Thomas (2001) consider that there are “economies of 
scope” between water production and losses. This is precisely what Martins et al (2012) try to 
verify in the Portuguese context. They found initially small economies of scope but this result 
changed as they introduced the fact that lost water cannot be sold. The authors therefore 
suggest that the intervention of a regulatory body might be necessary to avoid water losses.  
We offer an alternative way of considering water losses. Instead of defining them as 
outputs, we decided to regard them as inputs. This alternative viewpoint does not contradict 
the previous assessments. Instead, we consider that is more natural to define water losses as 
an input since there is a trade-off between investing resources in fixing the leakage or dealing 
with the problem by simply abstracting and treating more water. Firms face the dilemma of 
investing in infrastructure or dealing with increasing leakage over time. Our analytical 
framework has the additional benefit of providing water shadow prices. These shadow prices 
could inform companies with regard to the potential cost benefits of reducing losses, but could 
also be used to help inform policy makers seeking to set penalties for water companies that 
fail to avoid or reduce water losses.  
Our theoretical framework is not new. Pittman (1981) was one of the first articles 
where “quality” or “environmental” variables were treated as inputs. Although pollution was 
defined as an output, it functioned as input in the modelling. According to the author, this 
decision was reasonable because an increase of pollution “frees resources” for producing 
more output (Pittman, 1981, p. 3).  Cropper and Oates (1992) surveyed the literature on 
environmental economics and outlined the basic relationships among the different variables. 
In their scheme, emissions of waste dischargers and pollution were defined as inputs. The 
logic behind for this modelling was that any effort made to reduce emission necessarily 
implies a deviation of other resources, which entails a reduction in output.  
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Yaisawarng and Klein (1994) is another example of this strategy in modelling.  The 
authors define sulfur as input in their analysis of coal-burning plants under sulfur dioxin 
controls. The objective was to capture the different possibilities available to comply with 
environmental standards.  Reinhard, Lovell and Thijssen (1999, 2000) applied a similar 
approach to study Dutch dairy farms. They measured the technical and environmental 
efficiency of farms that were subject to strict regulation by the Dutch authorities. In their first 
paper they treat nitrogen surplus as bad input while in their second paper, the authors 
expanded their modelling to include two additional inputs (phosphates and total energy as a 
proxy of CO2). Giannakis, Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) study the UK electricity distribution 
network based on Yaisawarng and Klein (1994) work. In this context, the number of minutes 
lost and the number of interruptions were defined as ordinary inputs.  Yu, Jamasb and Pollitt 
(2007) and Growitsch, Jamasb and Pollitt (2009) extended the previous framework to analyze 
allocative efficiency in the UK and European electricity industries respectively.   
More recently, Coelli, Gautier, Perelman and Saplacan-Pop (2013) studied electricity 
distribution in France. As in the previous cases, they defined power interruptions as inputs but 
their main objective was to compute the cost of preventing outages for the electrical 
distribution units. In our study, we plan to use a similar approach, in order to compute the 
shadow price of water. We expect that our results could be used by the regulatory authorities 
to inform policies that aim to  reduce water losses.  
3. Methodology 
Imposing regularity conditions might be a necessary step to obtain economically 
meaningful results (Diewert and Wales, 1987; Wolff, Heckelei and Mittelhammer, 2010; Du, 
Parmeter and Racine, 2013). There are a myriad of methods dealing with this issue and 
different general approaches (e.g., frequentist/Bayesian, parametric/nonparametric, 
global/local/regional). One of the most cited methods in the frequentist/parametric/local is the 
one developed by Gallant and Golub (1984). The authors use a Fourier flexible form to 
enforce curvature restrictions. Nevertheless, this method has been deemed as very difficult to 
implement (Wolff, et al., 2004, O’Donnell and Coelli, 2005; Du et al., 2013). Diewert and 
Wales (1987) propose a global alternative to obtain satisfactory results but at the cost of 
forgoing flexibility of the functional form.  
Due to the complications that entail curvature restrictions, some authors have focused 
only on the monotonicity property. Färe, Grosskopf, Lovell and Yaisawarng (1993) use 
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Parametric Linear Programming (PLP) developed by Aigner and Chu (1968) to impose 
monotonicity constraint to selected outputs. Coelli et al. (2013) extended the previous 
framework to all output and input distance functions derivatives. Henningsen and Henning 
(2009) propose a three-step procedure to impose monotonicity regionally using minimum 
distance estimation.  Recently, Parmeter, Sun, Handerson and Kumbhakar (2014) extended 
the nonparametric technique of constraint weighted bootstrapping (CWB) to the parametric 
context (in particular to the class of linear regression estimators) in order to obtain results that 
comply with the monotonicity property. Their departure point is Du et al. (2013), which uses 
CWB for imposing curvature restriction in a non-parametric setting.  
Terrell (1996) is the seminal paper on the Bayesian/parametric/local approach. The 
author implements the Bayesian method to impose monotonicity and concavity restrictions to 
a cost function. Griffiths, O’Donnell and Cruz (2000) modified the previous framework by 
using the Metropolis-Hasting Algorithm instead of a Gibb sampler to estimate the posterior 
probabilities. O’Donnell and Coelli (2005) go one step further by estimating an output 
distance function that complies with monotonicity, convexity in outputs and quasi-convexity 
in inputs.  
In this article, we estimate a translog input distance function using Bayesian inference 
where the inefficiencies are time-invariant random variables. We impose homogeneity of 
degree one in inputs, monotonicity constraints, concavity in inputs and quasi-concavity in 
outputs. We followed O’Donnell and Coelli (2005) and Koop (2003) methodological 
framework. The results of the estimation are then used to compute the shadow price of water.  
There are four differences between our application and the one presented in O’Donnell 
and Coelli (2005). The first difference is that we compute an input distance function instead 
of an output distance function. Second, we have one additional output and one more input 
which makes the calculations much more complex. Third, a bad output (water losses) is 
treated as an input; as explained above.  The fourth and last difference is that  we treat the 
same decision making unit (DMU) in different regulatory periods as distinct entities instead of 
assuming time invariant inefficiencies for the complete analysed period.  
We start the description of the methodology by providing some definitions. A DMU 𝑖𝑖 
at period 𝑡𝑡 produces 𝑀𝑀 outputs: 𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 using 𝑁𝑁 inputs 𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 where 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1 … 𝐼𝐼}, m∈ {1 …𝑀𝑀}, 
𝑛𝑛 ∈ {1 …𝑁𝑁} and 𝑡𝑡 ∈ {1 …𝑇𝑇}. The total amount of outputs produced by firm 𝑖𝑖 at period 𝑡𝑡 is 
given by the vector 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = �𝑋𝑋1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� while the amount of inputs used is 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
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�𝑄𝑄1,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, … ,𝑄𝑄𝑀𝑀,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�. Technology at time 𝑡𝑡 is given by the technology set 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = {(𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕,𝑸𝑸𝒕𝒕): 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡} where 𝑿𝑿𝒕𝒕 is 𝐼𝐼 × 𝑁𝑁 matrix and 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 is I × 𝑀𝑀 matrix. 
An input distance function is the minimum proportional contraction of inputs for 
producing a given level of outputs (Coelli et al., 2005). It is defined as 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� =max�θ: θ > 0, �𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝜃𝜃⁄ ,𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡�. An input distance function can be approximated using a 
translog functional form. There are several ways to define the translog function; in this paper 
we used the following specification: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎0 + � 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑞𝑞�𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
+ 0.5 � �𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀
𝑙𝑙=1
𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
𝑞𝑞�𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞�𝑙𝑙,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + �𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛𝑥𝑥�𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1+ 0.5��𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘𝑁𝑁
𝑘𝑘=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1
𝑥𝑥�𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥�𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + � �𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1
𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
𝑞𝑞�𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥�𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆1?̃?𝑡
+ 0.5𝜆𝜆11?̃?𝑡2 + � 𝛾𝛾𝑚𝑚?̃?𝑡𝑞𝑞�𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
+ �𝜉𝜉𝑛𝑛?̃?𝑡𝑥𝑥�𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1
+ �𝜑𝜑𝑤𝑤𝑧𝑧𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊
𝑤𝑤=1
 
[1]  
 
Where 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡; the symbol ~ signifies that the variable is 
transformed as deviation from the mean (e.g. 𝑞𝑞�𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑞𝑞�𝑚𝑚); the trend is represented by 
?̃?𝑡 and 𝑧𝑧𝑤𝑤,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 for 𝑤𝑤 ∈ {1 …𝑊𝑊} are exogenous variables that might affect the technology and will 
be defined in the next section.  
In order to compute accurately the shadow prices, the input distance function should 
comply with three properties, monotonicity, curvature and homogeneity. The monotonicity 
constraint is given by the following derivatives:  
 
𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛 = 𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0 ∀𝑛𝑛 [2]  
 
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 = 𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚 ≥ 0 ∀𝑚𝑚 [3]  
 
Input distance functions are quasi-concave in outputs and concave in inputs (Coelli et al. 
2005). The condition of quasi-concavity is satisfied if the leading principal minors of the 
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matrix |𝐹𝐹�| alternate in sign starting with |𝐹𝐹1� | < 0 (Chiang, 1999 p.402). Matrix |𝐹𝐹�| is defined 
as follows:  
 |𝐹𝐹�| = � 0 𝑓𝑓1 … 𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓1 𝑓𝑓11 … 𝑓𝑓1𝑀𝑀
⋮ ⋮ … ⋮
𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀 𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀1 … 𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀� [4]  
 
Where 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 has been previously defined (3) while 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 = 𝜕𝜕2𝐷𝐷 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚⁄ 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙 .Concavity in inputs is 
satisfied if the matrix |𝐺𝐺| is negative semi-definite (Chiang, 1999, p.354). This condition is 
satisfied if the principal minors6 alternate in signs starting with |𝐺𝐺1| ≤ 0 (Simon and Blume, 
1994, p. 383). 
 |𝐺𝐺| = �𝑔𝑔11 … 𝑔𝑔1𝑁𝑁⋮ … ⋮
𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁1 … 𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁� [5]  
Where 𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 = ∂2D ∂xn⁄ ∂xk 
Finally, we need to impose homogeneity of degree one in inputs since we use radial 
projections to measure distance. This condition is satisfied by using one of the inputs as 
numeraire. Therefore, expression (1) can be transformed as follows:  
  
−𝑥𝑥�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎0 + � 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑞𝑞�𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
+ 0.5 � �𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀
𝑙𝑙=1
𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
𝑞𝑞�𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞�𝑙𝑙,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + �𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥�𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ �𝑁𝑁−1
𝑛𝑛=1+ 0.5 � �𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘𝑁𝑁−1
𝑘𝑘=1
𝑁𝑁−1
𝑛𝑛=1
�𝑥𝑥�𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ ��𝑥𝑥�𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ �
+ � �𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁−1
𝑛𝑛=1
𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
𝑞𝑞�𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝑥𝑥�𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ � + 𝜆𝜆1?̃?𝑡 + 0.5𝜆𝜆11?̃?𝑡2
+ � 𝛾𝛾𝑚𝑚?̃?𝑡𝑞𝑞�𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
+ �𝜉𝜉𝑛𝑛?̃?𝑡�𝑥𝑥�𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ �𝑁𝑁−1
𝑛𝑛=1
+ �𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝𝑧𝑧𝑝𝑝,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃
𝑝𝑝=1
− �ln𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� 𝑥𝑥�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�  
[6]  
 
                                                          
6 Leading principal minors and principal minors are two different concepts. See Simon and Blume (1994) p.381-
383.  
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Equation (6) can be simply written as:  
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝓧𝓧𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕𝜷𝜷 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 [7]  
Where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = −𝑥𝑥�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡; 𝛃𝛃 is a vector of parameters 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑝𝑝, 𝜆𝜆, 𝛾𝛾, 𝜉𝜉 and 𝜑𝜑; 𝓧𝓧𝐢𝐢,𝐭𝐭 is a large matrix 
that includes a vector of ones 𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and their corresponding cross-terms in the order 
given by (6); 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is an error term incorporated to equation (6), it represents noise and the term 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = −𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 measures the inefficiency. As we mentioned before, we assumed a time-
invariant efficiency within regulatory periods. One of the reasons behind this decision is the 
trade-off between taking advantage of the panel-data structure of the data and having time-
variant efficiencies. Moreover, Fernandez, Osiewalski and Steel (1997) proved that 
implementing time-variant efficiency models (pure cross-section models) entails that the 
posterior distribution does not exist if improper priors are assumed7. Since we used a non-
informative prior that is improper, we cannot implement this specification8.  
 
The Bayesian method 
A detailed description of the Bayesian method of inference is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Koop (2003) provides a good explanation of the subject. We will briefly summarize the 
most relevant aspects for our application.  Bayesian inference is based on Bayes theorem: 
 𝑝𝑝(𝜷𝜷,ℎ,𝒖𝒖, 𝜇𝜇−1|𝒚𝒚) ∝ 𝑝𝑝(𝒚𝒚|𝜷𝜷,ℎ,𝒖𝒖,𝜇𝜇−1) × 𝑝𝑝(𝜷𝜷) × 𝑝𝑝(ℎ) × 𝑝𝑝(𝒖𝒖|𝜇𝜇−1) × 𝑝𝑝(𝜇𝜇−1) [8]  
Equation (8) basically states that posterior distribution is proportional to the likelihood 
function (first term in the multiplication) times the prior (the other terms in the 
multiplication). Bayesian inference consists in making assumptions on the densities functions 
and correcting the estimation in an iterative process. Econometrics also makes this kind of 
assumptions but only on the likelihood function. 
 𝜷𝜷,ℎ,𝒖𝒖 and 𝜇𝜇−1  are the parameters of the model. 𝜷𝜷 has been previously defined; ℎ is 
the inverse of the variance of 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡; 𝒖𝒖 is a vector of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ; and 𝜇𝜇−1 is the inverse of the natural 
logarithm of efficiency distribution median. The 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖’s are treated as random variables. In the 
                                                          
7 Fernandez et al. (1997) explain that it is possible to estimate a time-variant efficiency model using a slightly 
informative prior (Proposition 2). Koop, Osiewalski and Steel (1999, 2000)  use the proposed methodology to 
estimate a production frontier. We tried to implement Fernandez et al (1997) approach but we faced 
computational complications.  
8 Our model specification corresponds to the case 4a in Fernandez et al. (1997).  
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Bayesian inference model the time invariant inefficiencies depend on the median of the 
efficiency distribution. This means that the stochastic frontier model requires a hierarchical 
prior as expressed by the formula.  𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝|𝜇𝜇−1) × 𝑝𝑝(𝜇𝜇−1).  
As in O’Donnell and Coelli (2005) and Koop (2003) the likelihood function 
𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦|𝛽𝛽, ℎ,𝑝𝑝, 𝜇𝜇−1) is given by the following formula:  
 𝑝𝑝(𝒚𝒚|𝜷𝜷,ℎ,𝒖𝒖, 𝜇𝜇−1)
= � ℎ𝑇𝑇2(2𝜋𝜋)𝑇𝑇2 �𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 �−ℎ2 (𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊 − 𝓧𝓧𝒊𝒊𝜷𝜷 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜾𝜾𝑻𝑻)′(𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊 − 𝓧𝓧𝒊𝒊𝜷𝜷 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝜾𝜾𝑻𝑻)��𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1  [9]  
Where 𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊 = (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖1 …𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)′ vector and 𝜾𝜾𝑻𝑻 is a 𝑇𝑇 vector of ones. 𝓧𝓧𝒊𝒊 = [𝓧𝓧𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 …𝓧𝓧𝒊𝒊𝑻𝑻] The priors of 
𝜷𝜷 and ℎ are independent;   𝑝𝑝(𝜷𝜷) follows a multi-normal distribution where the parameters are 
constrained to comply with the monotonicity and curvature restrictions;  𝑝𝑝(ℎ) is a non-
informative prior ℎ−1. The vector 𝒖𝒖 depends on 𝜇𝜇−1. 𝑝𝑝(𝒖𝒖|𝜇𝜇−1) is distribuited gamma with 
mean 𝜇𝜇 and variance 2 and 𝜇𝜇−1 is also distributed gamma with mean −ln (𝜏𝜏) and variance 2. 𝜏𝜏 
is the prior median inefficiency. We assume that 𝜏𝜏 = 0.875 as implemented by Koop et al 
(1995) and similar to the value used in O’Donnell and Coelli (2005).  
Estimation process 
The algorithm used in our computations is described in figure 2. It starts with a 
starting point value which complies with the monotonicity and curvature constraints. 
Afterwards, random draws are obtained for each one of the parameters from their conditional 
posterior distributions (This method is called Gibbs Sampler). If the draws comply with the 
monotonicity and curvature restrictions then the acceptance probability ratio is computed. If 
the ratio is larger than a random number generated between zero and one; then the iteration is 
included for the estimation; if not, the iteration is discarded. This process continues one 
million times. There is a burning period of eight hundred thousand iterations.   
INSERT FIGURE 2 
The initial starting point is the most time consuming part in the estimation process. We 
have one output and one input more than O’Donnell and Coelli (2005). Therefore, in order to 
find a set of parameters (In our case thirty-five) that complies with monotonicity and 
curvature restrictions simultaneously, we had to use a grid search over the parameter space. 
This difficulty could explain why we need so many iterations to find significant results.  
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The computation of the Gibbs Sampler uses the conditional posteriors of each one of 
the parameters in order to simulate the posterior joint distribution 𝑝𝑝(𝜷𝜷,ℎ,𝒖𝒖, 𝜇𝜇−1|𝒚𝒚). Details of 
how is done can be found in Koop (2003, p. 62).  The conditional posteriors for our 
application are described in Koop (2003, p. 171) and are reproduced here9:  
  𝑝𝑝(𝜷𝜷|𝒚𝒚,ℎ,𝒖𝒖,𝜇𝜇−1)~𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙�𝜷𝜷�,ℎ−1(𝓧𝓧′𝓧𝓧)−1�1(𝜷𝜷 ∈ 𝑅𝑅) [10]  
 𝑝𝑝(ℎ|𝒚𝒚,𝜷𝜷,𝒖𝒖,𝜇𝜇−1)~𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎(?̅?𝑝2,𝜎𝜎�) [11]  
 
𝑝𝑝(𝒖𝒖|𝒚𝒚,𝜷𝜷,ℎ, 𝜇𝜇−1)~𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙(𝓧𝓧�𝛽𝛽 − 𝒚𝒚� − (𝑇𝑇ℎ𝜇𝜇)−1𝜾𝜾𝑵𝑵, (𝑇𝑇ℎ)−1)1�(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0)𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖=1
 [12]  
 𝑝𝑝(𝜇𝜇−1|𝒚𝒚,𝜷𝜷,ℎ,𝒖𝒖) = 𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎(?̅?𝜇𝑢𝑢,𝜎𝜎�𝑢𝑢) [13]  
Where10 𝜷𝜷� = (𝓧𝓧′𝓧𝓧)−1𝓧𝓧[𝒚𝒚 − (𝜾𝜾𝑵𝑵 ⊗ 𝜾𝜾𝑻𝑻)𝒖𝒖]; 𝓧𝓧 = [𝓧𝓧𝒊𝒊 …𝓧𝓧𝑰𝑰]; 𝑅𝑅 is a subset of the parameter 
space where 𝜷𝜷 complies with the properties of monotonicity and curvature;  ?̅?𝑝2 =[ 𝒚𝒚 + (𝜾𝜾𝑵𝑵 ⊗ 𝜾𝜾𝑻𝑻)𝒖𝒖 −𝓧𝓧𝜷𝜷]′ [ 𝒚𝒚 + (𝜾𝜾𝑵𝑵 ⊗ 𝜾𝜾𝑻𝑻)𝒖𝒖 −𝓧𝓧𝜷𝜷] 𝜎𝜎�⁄  ;𝜎𝜎� = 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇; ?̅?𝜇𝑢𝑢 = 2𝑁𝑁 + 2 and 𝜎𝜎�𝑢𝑢 =(𝑁𝑁 + 1)[𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖′𝜄𝜄𝑁𝑁 − 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛(𝜏𝜏)]−1 
Due to the fact that it is very difficult to sample from a constrained multi-normal 
distribution, we use the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm11 within Gibbs for 𝜷𝜷. We did not use 
any sub-iterations in our estimation. The acceptance rate of the M-H was 24.5% which is 
within the expected range (Koop, 2003, p. 98).  
Convergence Diagnostic 
The convergence of the Gibbs sampler procedure is assessed through a Geweke test. 
Essentially, it is a comparison between the fraction of the early accepted draws with respect to 
the fraction of the last accepted draws. If there is convergence, these two sets should be 
similar. The distribution of this test is asymptotically standard normal. We compare the first 
                                                          
9 In Koop (2003), the term 1(𝜷𝜷 ∈ 𝑅𝑅) is missing because Koop’s estimation is unconstrained.  
10 ⨂ is the symbol of the kronecker product which is defined as follows:  
𝐴𝐴⊗ 𝐵𝐵 = �𝑎𝑎11𝐵𝐵 … 𝑎𝑎1𝑚𝑚𝐵𝐵⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛1𝐵𝐵 … 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝐵𝐵� where 𝐴𝐴 is a 𝑛𝑛 × 𝑚𝑚 matrix and 𝐵𝐵 is a 𝑝𝑝 × 𝑞𝑞  matrix  
Source: http://mathworld.wolfram.com/KroneckerProduct.html 
11 See Koop (2003, p. 92). 
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10% of the sample with the last 40% of the sample.  Geweke (1992) provides a description for 
this test.   
 
Shadow prices 
After estimating equation (6) through Bayesian inference, we can compute the shadow 
prices. To obtain shadow prices, it is necessary to compute the input elasticities first.  
 
𝜂𝜂𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ∂ln𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥�𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  [14]  
Where 𝜂𝜂𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the elasticity of input 𝑛𝑛 at time t for the DMU 𝑖𝑖. This elasticity is 
basically the derivative of equation (1). The formula for shadow prices is:  
 
𝜙𝜙𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜂𝜂𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 [15]  
𝜙𝜙𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents how many units of input 𝑘𝑘 are necessary to substitute one unit of input 𝑛𝑛 in 
the case of firm 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡. A high  𝜙𝜙𝑛𝑛,𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 means that the good 𝑛𝑛 is expensive in terms of 𝑘𝑘. 
4. Data and Empirical Specification 
The English and Welsh water sector’s regulatory model was dramatically altered by 
privatisation of the ten publicly owned regional water authorities (RWA) in 1989. Despite 
some relatively minor changes its current regulatory structure has been in place since then.  
Thus, economic regulation of the industry is carried out through a price-cap regime 
implemented by the Water Service Regulation Authority (Ofwat), while monitoring and 
regulation of drinking water and environmental standards are respectively carried out by the 
Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) and the Environment Agency (EA).  As mentioned 
above, we focus on the following three regulatory periods: 1996-2000, 2001-2005 and 2006-
2010.12 The decision to focus on these periods was driven by two factors.  Firstly, given ex-
ante five year price determinations, we wished to consider the performance of companies, 
over the entire regulatory period covered by price review.  Secondly, we also wished to insure 
the stability of our data series, by employing data based on consistent regulatory data. 
However, such consistent regulatory data only became available in 1993, and was no longer 
available after 2012, making analysis of the first and current regulatory periods infeasible.     
                                                          
12 For a more detailed presentation of water sector organization, see Saal and Parker (2006).   
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Despite the stability of the underlying databases, the water industry did become much 
more consolidated:  From the original 39 companies operating in 1989, only 22 were active in 
2010 after several successive mergers. Moreover, there are two kinds of companies: those 
which provide water and sewerage services (WaSC), which resulted from RWA privatisation 
and the others that only provide water services (WoC), and which were always under private 
ownership. In this paper we analyse both types of companies but focus only on their water 
supply activities, which are the abstraction, treatment and distribution of water. Saal and 
Parker (2006) and Bottasso et al. (2011) address the issue of the validity in assuming a 
homogeneous technology for WaSCs and WoCs. They conclude that modelling both kinds of 
entities together is inappropriate due to technological differences. Nevertheless, in this study, 
we choose to model them together for several reasons. First, Ofwat requires WaSC companies 
to keep completely separate accounts and relevant technical information for water and 
sewerage activities, and for regulatory purposes both kinds of entities are treated equally. 
Second, we want to report all shadow prices and since we use very flexible specification, a 
translog function, a large cross-section dataset suits better our purposes. It is worth 
emphasizing that this flexibility allows encompassing a large number of operating situations 
(e.g. rural and urban areas).  Moreover, this would not be feasible without the simultaneous 
inclusion of the WaSCs and WoCs, as the WoCs cover largely urban areas.  In contrast, while 
the WasC are also responsible for many large urban areas, they are also responsible for most 
rural water supply.   
We identify three inputs. Operational expenditures (OPEX) which correspond to 
operational costs deflated using the Office of National Statistics producer price index for 
materials and fuels purchased in the collection, purification and distribution of water 
(2010=1.0). Capital stock, a proxy of physical capital, is based on the modern equivalent asset 
(MEA) estimation of the replacement cost of water operations related net tangible fixed 
assets. It is assumed that the MEA valuations for the year ending in 2010 are the most 
accurate as they embody all previous revaluations of the MEA capital stocks. Capital stocks 
for previous years are calculated using the perpetual inventory method and data on investment 
and current cost depreciation. Finally, water leakage corresponds to the number of cubic 
meters lost in the distribution process including customer supply pipes, but excluding losses 
attributable to leakage within costumers’ properties. The output variables are total water 
delivered to consumers, the number of connected properties and the total area served by the 
company. This exact output specification has been previously employed for English and 
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Welsh water companies in Bottasso & Conti (2009b), and is consistent with a well-established 
literature suggesting the need to fully control for volumes, connections, and a utility’s 
geographic scale (See, for example Torres & Morrison Paul, 2006) 
Control variables are included so as to allow for differences in production technology 
that may result from differences in operating environment. For example, water could come 
from impounding reservoirs, boreholes or rivers. Treatment as well as distribution system 
design are both likely to vary significantly based on abstraction sources. We therefore create 
three variables corresponding to the proportion of water abstraction from each one of these 
sources, excluding the one representing river sources from the empirical analysis so as to 
avoid perfect multicollinearity.  Thus, for example water sourced from impounding reservoirs 
is more likely than river water to be transported in gravity fed systems, with lower pressure 
and hence lower input requirements. Similarly, as boreholes are relatively small sources and 
tend to be integrated into the water distribution network, transportation distances and hence 
input requirements may be lower.     
Several further operating characteristic variables are considered:  The precedent 
established in Saal & Parker (2001) and subsequent work suggests the employment of DWI 
data on the minimum zonal compliance of six drinking water quality tests to control for the 
considerable increase in drinking water quality over the sample period, to which considerable 
investments in capital can be attributed.  Similarly, a measure of the average number of mains 
burst per 1,000 km of mains, demonstrates a considerable improvement in the integrity of the 
water network and hence the reliability of water supply.  A measure of average pumping head 
is considered so as to allow for increased pumping and higher pressure levels in the system, 
which will influence input requirements. Given that metering of residential customers is 
neither required, common, or uniformly applied in England and Wales, a control variable for 
the portion of customers who are unmetered is also considered, Finally, a binary variable 
indicates whether the company is a WaSC or not.   
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the chosen output and input variables as 
well as the control variables Furthermore, we include a few ratios containing relevant 
information: OPEX per cubic meter of water delivered, capital per square kilometer of area 
served, and the percentages of leakage in overall distribution input.   
INSERT TABLE 1 
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The statistics reported in the first columns of Table 1 correspond to the whole period 
and are unweighted. They illustrate the high range of variation across firms, mainly due to 
differences in the scale of operation and population density. The two additional columns in 
the middle show the average for each variable by type of water distributor (WaSC/WoCs). To 
mitigate the effect of mergers on interpreting  descriptive statistics over time, the information 
by period reported  in the last columns is either consolidated (outputs and inputs) or weighted 
by the volume of distributed water (control variables and other indicators). These last three 
columns show the values for each of the three regulatory periods discussed above. 
The main facts observed on Table 1 are: 1) On the output side, we observe only a 
slight increase in the number of connected properties over the entire period, while aggregate 
water delivered volumes are relatively stable. 2) On the input side, while capital stock has 
increased moderately over time, operational expenditures (OPEX) have decreased 
dramatically. Leakage volumes also diminish but in a lower proportion, and the vast majority 
of this decline occurred in the regulatory period ending in 2000 (as illustrated in figure 1).    
3) The control variables illustrate considerable improvements in quality, via improved 
drinking water quality, a decreasing number of bursts, and increasing average pumping head, 
which is generally associated with improved pressure provision to customers.  However, 
while the proportion of customers receiving unmeasured water only decreased from a 
weighted mean of 89 percent in 1996-00 to 69 percent in the 2006-10 period, the vast majority 
of customers remained unmetered. 4) WoCs are significantly smaller than WaSCs with 
respect to all inputs and outputs dimensions.  5) Moreover, the WoCs have considerably lower 
leakage than the WaSCs.   6) Finally, as expected, operational cost per cubic meter of water 
distributed decreases while capital stock density (by square kilometer) increases, thereby 
further demonstrating deepening capital intensity, and OPEX reductions. 
5. Results 
Tables 2 to 5 contain the results of the empirical analysis. Table 2 reports a standard 
SFA estimation of the model, a Bayesian econometric model without leakage as an input 
(Model 0) and the main Bayesian results with leakage as inputs (Model 1). Given space 
limitations, a 90% confidence interval, the standard deviation and the results of the Geweke 
test are only reported for the main results. As the data has been normalized around the 
geometric mean, the first order coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities for the sample 
average firm.   
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The SFA and the Bayesian results are very similar; the main differences are found in 
the cross terms, which is the expected consequence of imposing curvature and monotonicity 
restrictions. The capital, leakage and OPEX elasticities for the average firm are 0.27, 0.31 and 
0.42 respectively. The first order coefficients for the output variables water delivered, 
connected properties and supply area, imply that the average firm shows small decreasing 
returns to scale (RTS=0.98)13. The number of connected properties is therefore the output 
variable that has the most explanatory power followed by the total water delivered and the 
supply area (a similar order is observed for the SFA and Model 0). Since the Geweke test has 
a standard normal distribution, the reference value is 1.96 in absolute terms. Therefore the 
coefficients for capital and supply area have mild problems of convergence. All the first order 
coefficients are within the 90% confidence interval.  
INSERT TABLE 2 
Concerning the cross and squared terms, we obtain several interesting results. Output 
elasticities increase at increasing rate; all coefficients of the squared terms are significant and 
negative in Table 2. Nevertheless, their interaction counterbalances this effect. For example, 
keeping all things equal, increasing the amount of water delivered reduces the elasticity of 
connected properties (𝑎𝑎12 = 0.4072) highlighting the interaction between these two output 
variables. There are three significant coefficients with respect to inputs. First as capital 
growths its elasticity decreases (𝑏𝑏11 = −0.1729)  second, capital elasticity increases as the 
supply area increases (𝑝𝑝31 = 0.1005) and finally the leakage elasticity decreases if the supply 
area increases (𝑝𝑝32 = −0.1271). This last result might be capturing the fact that there are less 
leakage problems in low density areas. None of the interaction terms with respect to the trend 
are significant. Moreover, the trend, which captures technical change, is positive 
(technological progress) but not significant as well.  
Three out of seven control variables are found to be significant. Average pumping 
head, the percentage of unmetered households and main bursts over 1,000 km increase input 
requirements. The effect of average pumping head corroborates Bottasso and Conti (2009b) 
findings while for the case of unmetered households, the result contradicts Saal et al. (2007).  
However, in Saal et al. (2007), leakage was not treated as an input. Hence, metering reduces 
input requirements once leakage is accounted for. The WaSC dummy was not significant, this 
                                                          
13 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 = −(1 ∑ 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚=1⁄ ) 
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could suggest that our overall model is otherwise sufficiently controlling for differences 
between the  WaSCs and WoCs  
INSERT TABLE 3 
Table 3 reports the average input and output elasticities, the time elasticity and the 
shadow price of water by year and regulatory period. It also shows the average efficiency by 
regulatory period. We do not observe radical changes in these variables over time. Capital 
elasticity slowly increases with time while leakage elasticity decreases which reflects the 
substitution of OPEX by capital previously observed in table 1. Regarding output variables, 
they virtually remain the same for the whole analyzed period. Time elasticity, which captures 
the elasticity with respect to the trend, was negative in the first two years and then 
continuously increasing meaning that every year there is a small technological progress (0.3% 
per year on average). The average efficiency increased significantly in the second regulatory 
period, coinciding with the period where the water prices felt in real terms following a 
regulatory adjustment of the price cap (Saal and Parker, 2006).  
The average shadow price of water in terms of OPEX14,15 �𝜙𝜙𝑥𝑥3,𝑥𝑥2� is about £2.01 per 
cubic meter of water loss. Table 3 reveals the declining trend of the shadow price of water, as 
on average, it became  increasingly cheaper to reduce leakage. Figures 3 shows the shadow 
prices of water in relation to water leakage. Notice that our results comply with the economic 
intuition; the operators with the higher leakage are those that value water the least16. These 
figures are a persuasive argument suggesting the need to implement directed regulatory 
incentives in order to reduce leakage.  
.  
INSERT FIGURE 3  
The distinction between WaSCs and WoCs reveals two interesting details (last two 
lines in Table 3). First, the elasticities for connected properties and OPEX for the WaSCs 
companies are relatively larger than for the WoCs, emphasizing the differences between these 
                                                          
14 From now on, the shadow price of water.  
15 The shadow price of water losses in terms of capital can also be computed. However, this shadow prices have 
a difficult interpretation since the capital is a stock variable. In principle, it is possible to compare both shadow 
prices if we multiply the shadow prices of water losses in terms of capital by the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC). Given the fact that the industry is very capital intensive, these shadow prices are very high (£16.83 on 
average.) so in practical terms, they cannot play a role in curving leakage. Shadow prices of water in terms of 
capital are available upon request. 
16 We reach to the same conclusion when we estimate the model using the SFA method without imposing any 
regularity restriction; companies with higher leakage levels value water losses less.  
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two types of water distributors. However, the most remarkable disparity comes from the 
shadow prices of water. For the WaSCs the average shadow price is £0.69 while for the WoCs 
the average price is £2.99. This large divergence is driven by the elasticities with respect to 
leakage and OPEX. Thus, Table 3 reveals that the average OPEX elasticities for the 
WaSCs(0.5422) is considerably higher than for the WoCs (0,3375) , while the opposite is true 
for the average leakage elasticity which is 0.3791 for the WoCs and 0.2170 for the WaSCs .  
Table 4 shows the average shadow prices by regulatory period and company and the 
estimated efficiency scores for model 1 and 0, and also draws a distinction between WoCs 
and WaSCs.  In total there were 35 different operators between 1995 and 2010. Although we 
do not identify them by name, these water supply companies share some particular features 
that are worth highlighting. First, the reduction of the shadow prices analyzed previously was 
experienced by almost all the firms in the industry. Only very few companies have estimated 
increases in their shadow prices for water. Corroborating our previous findings, the WaSCs 
show the lowest shadow prices for water. Therefore, this type of company will have fewer 
difficulties in reducing leakage if the regulator decides to impose stringent rules in this regard.   
In general terms, the efficiency scores remain stable across regulatory periods 
independently of which model was used to compute them. However, Model 1, which controls 
for leakage has considerably lower estimated efficiency scores,  Thus for example, in the 06-
10 regulatory period average estimated efficiency for all firms was 0.91122 in Model 0 and 
0.8399 in Model 1  This difference  could suggest that the price cap regulation system and the 
related cost efficiency estimates relied on by Ofwat since privatization, which have focused 
primarily on measuring and incentivizing cost reduction, have not properly accounted for and 
incentivized leakage reduction.   
INSERT TABLE 4 
In order to understand these results by company, it is better to contextualize them by 
observing how much companies charge per cubic meter of water. We therefore employ data 
collated by Ofwat on average household water bills per cubic meter of water delivered in 
2010 (Ofwat 2011). For customers who have meters, Ofwat sets out three different 
consumption scenarios: 60, 110 and 160m3 per year. Since our results are expressed in 
sterling pounds of 2010, the information is quite convenient, and we therefore relate these 
charges to our shadow price estimates in Table 5.   
INSERT TABLE 5 
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Table 5 suggests that WoCs do not have incentives to reduce water losses, since the 
price of one additional cubic meter of water sold is almost always below the estimated 
shadow price of water. This is in stark contrast for the WaSC ; where the estimated  marginal 
shadow price of reducing leakage is always below the marginal benefit associated with selling 
an additional cubic meter of water. Paradoxically the percentage leakage for WaSCs is higher 
than for the WoCs (see figure 1 for the whole sector).  Thus, it is not surprising that the 
companies most affected by the mandatory targets imposed in the period 1996-2001 were the 
WaSCs.  In contrast, the WoCs barely improved their leakage during this period, which is an  
outcome consistent with our finding that leakage reduction is relatively costly and hence 
difficult for them to achieve. Thus, our shadow price estimates strongly suggest that even 
though economic incentives for leakage reduction appear to exist, the WaSCs seem to be 
unwilling or unable to reduce their leakage levels without more directed regulatory 
intervention.  However, an alternative interpretation could be that they are responding 
appropriately to a regulatory system that has primarily incentivized cost reduction.   
 To further understand this phenomenon, it is important to keep two things in mind. 
Firstly, the percentage of unmetered households remained very high in 2010 (in some cases it 
was beyond 80%) thus a standard marginal incentive approach which assumes that one cubic 
meter of water saved, will be sold for additional revenue and hence profit is not relevant for 
most companies.  This could explain the small correlation between the shadow prices and the 
price charged to customers; since it might be the byproduct of cross-subsidies between 
unmetered and metered customers. Secondly, as discussed above, WaSCs have a much higher 
estimated OPEX elasticity than the WoCs.  Thus, a regulatory scheme that has strongly 
incentivized OPEX cost reductions and favored capital investments is likely to have 
particularly impacted their willingness to make costly efforts to reduce water leakage. Stated 
differently, the relevant opportunity cost might be the penalty of not achieving the regulator’s 
cost efficiency target, which does not directly account for leakage levels.  Thus, in order to 
encourage leakage reduction, the regulatory authorities should implement policies that more 
explicitly target this issue.   
6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this study is to compute the shadow price of water losses in England 
and Wales for the period 1996 to 2010. This information is useful to understand how much 
water is valued by water supply companies. Moreover, evaluation of estimated shadow prices 
23 
 
can indicate whether the incentive regulation system that has been in place since privatization 
has been effective in reducing water losses. Given increasing water demand and concerns that 
climate change will impact water scarcity and the likelihood of severe droughts, our results 
have provided some important insights with regard to whether the current regulatory structure 
encourages good water management.  
On average our estimates of the shadow price of water exhibit a declining trend over 
the period 1996 to 2010.  Given moderate increases in overall water demand, coupled with an 
equally moderate reduction in overall water leakage, these results suggest that English and 
Welsh water companies have been able to reduce the marginal cost of leakage reduction. 
Nevertheless, given that average leakage remains at well over 20 percent, this decline in the 
shadow price of water also suggests that firms are not aggressively engaging in activities to 
reduce leakage further, as this would tend to drive the shadow price of water upward.   
Moreover, our results also suggest an important distinction which must be drawn 
between water only companies (WoCs) and water and sewerage companies (WaSCs), as the 
estimated shadow price of water is markedly lower for the latter firms.  In fact, the estimated 
shadow prices suggest that if marginal quantity pricing applied for all consumers, the WaSCs 
should have strong incentives to increase their profits by reducing leakage and selling the 
water to metered customers.  However, we believe several factors help explain the fact that 
WaSCs do not appear to do this.     
As the percentage of households with water metering is remarkably low in the U.K, 
the majority of households pay their water bills as a fixed amount based on the value of their 
property.  Thus, there is a potential distortion in the water prices faced by metered customers 
given potential cross-subsidies between consumers with metered water and those who pay 
according to the valuation of their property. More significantly, the persistence of fixed cost 
pricing implies that it is not reasonable to assume that firms would have “normal” marginal 
incentives, as one cubic meter of water saved will not necessarily be sold for additional 
revenues.  E.g., as the vast majority of water customers are not metered, the resulting absence 
of quantity based pricing explains why water suppliers do not seize the apparent opportunity 
to increase profits implied by shadow prices that are below water prices.   
Thus, our results suggest that elimination of a pricing system in which customers can 
consume as much water as they want without paying additional fees, would significantly 
improve incentives to reduce water leakage. Policy makers should therefore adopt the 
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international norm in which all customers are metered, albeit allowing for a transition period 
to allow consumers adjust to the new pricing regime.    
In addition to considering the appropriateness of non-metered water pricing, policy 
makers should also consider if the post-privatization regulatory system appropriately 
incentivizes leakage reduction.  If this system has strongly incentivized OPEX cost reductions 
and favored capital investments, it is also possible that it has negatively impacted incentives 
to engage in the costly maintenance required to achieve lower leakage levels.  We believe that 
our finding that estimated efficiency scores are substantially higher when losses are not 
included in our model is consistent with this conclusion.  This is because it suggests that the 
relevant opportunity cost of leakage reducing effort might really be the penalty of not 
achieving the regulator’s cost efficiency targets, which similarly do not directly account for 
leakage.  
A detailed consideration of an appropriate policy response to this issue is clearly 
beyond the scope of this paper.  However, increasing water scarcity suggests that policy 
makers should consider how they can more appropriately incentivize regulated firms to use 
water resources efficiently.  We might suggest the adoption of an implicit or explicit system 
of scarcity based water abstraction pricing by the Environment Agency.  Such a system would 
require firms to account for not only the private costs of water supply but also environmental 
and scarcity costs, and would thereby improve both regulatory cost assessments and firms’ 
incentives to better manage scarce water resources.    
In terms of the methodology, we applied O’Donnell and Coelli’s (2005) Bayesian 
framework.  We estimated a translog input distance function with three outputs and three 
inputs which is much difficult to estimate than the 2x2 model estimated by these authors. Our 
model has 33 variables and it requires finding a starting point where monotonicity, 
homogeneity and curvature restrictions apply simultaneously. This is the main limitation of 
the method since it reduces significantly the possibility of testing other model specifications. 
For future research, it would be useful to elaborate a much more formal algorithm for finding 
starting points in settings with more than two input/outputs. Despite this limitation, the 
advantage of the Bayesian approach is that all the observation complies with the regularity 
conditions; which is better than relying on average information for assessing an industry.  
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Figure 1: Ratio Total Leakage over Total Water Distributed 
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Figure 2: Flow Chart Bayesian Inference Procedure 
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Figure 3: Shadow Prices of Water in Terms of Opex 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
  Units 1996-2010 Mean Regulation periods 
  Mean Min Max Wascs Wocs 96-00 01-05 06-10 
Outputs and inputs   Un-weighted   Consolidated for the industry 
Water delivered  𝑄𝑄1 106m3 497 23 1,930  929  176 11,703 11,827 11,468 
Connected properties  𝑄𝑄2 # 1,013 39 3,736  1,925  336 23,029 23,803 24,480 
Water supply area  𝑄𝑄3 km2 6,436 90 22,090 13,115  1,476 151,038 151,038 151,038 
Capital  𝑋𝑋1 106£ 4,394 139 17,454  8,691  1,204 99,073 103,512 106,783 
Leakage 𝑋𝑋2 106m3 153 5 1,109  306  41 4,066 3,434 3,315 
Operating expenditures  𝑋𝑋3 106£ 84 4 377  155  31 2,263 1,971 1,681 
Control variables   Un-weighted   Weighted means* 
Average pumping head 𝑍𝑍1  128 56 219 127  129 128 135 134 
Unmetered households 𝑍𝑍2 % 79 32 100 79  79 89 79 69 
Main bursts /1,000 km 𝑍𝑍3  187 70 550 204  174 223 189 183 
Water quality  𝑍𝑍4 % 80 20 100 77  83 68 80 89 
Impounding  𝑍𝑍6 % 15 0 100 30 17 24 24 30 
Borehole  𝑍𝑍7 % 46 0 100 40 44 31 30 30 
River  𝑍𝑍8 % 36 0 100 30 60 41 42 36 
Other indicators   Un-weighted   Weighted means* 
Opex / water delivered  £/m3 0.18 0.11 0.32 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.15 
Capital / area  £/m2 0.78 0.29 2.02 0.75 0.80 0.66 0.69 0.71 
Leakage   % 26 14 63 31 23 26† 22† 22† 
Sample           
Firms  # 35   13 22 30 22 23 
Observations  # 352   150 202 134 110 108 
+Currency units are expressed in sterling pounds of 2010. * Water delivered used as weight. † Consolidated for the industry 
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Table 2: Results of the Bayesian Estimation and Comparison with the SFA Model and a Bayesian Model without Water 
Losses as an Input 
Parameters SFA (Pool) 
Bayesian Estimation 
Model 0 Model 1 5% 95%  Std Dev Geweke 
𝑎𝑎0 Constant 0.1659 0.1688 0.2475 0.1465 0.4001 sig 0.0718 -3.45 
𝑎𝑎1 𝑞𝑞1 water delivered  -0.4049 -0.3949 -0.3397 -0.4997 -0.2088 sig 0.0677 1.24 
𝑎𝑎2 𝑞𝑞2 connected properties -0.4839 -0.4843 -0.4253 -0.5645 -0.2606 sig 0.0567 0.38 
𝑎𝑎3 𝑞𝑞3 supply area -0.1469 -0.1813 -0.2580 -0.3260 -0.2071 sig 0.0990 -2.40 
𝑎𝑎11 𝑞𝑞12  -0.7108 -0.7664 -0.5601 -0.7951 -0.3605 sig 0.1130 0.16 
𝑎𝑎22 𝑞𝑞22  -1.7119 -0.8266 -0.6530 -0.9483 -0.4118 sig 0.0810 0.64 
𝑎𝑎33 𝑞𝑞32  -0.3742 -0.1700 -0.2432 -0.2909 -0.2055 sig 0.0873 2.53 
𝑎𝑎12 𝑞𝑞1𝑞𝑞2  0.9768 0.6720 0.4072 0.2210 0.6536 sig 0.0915 -3.71 
𝑎𝑎13 𝑞𝑞1𝑞𝑞3  -0.2485 0.0542 0.1175 0.0500 0.1894 sig 0.0363 0.55 
𝑎𝑎23 𝑞𝑞2𝑞𝑞3  0.6463 0.1277 0.1676 0.0982 0.2419 sig 0.1333 0.83 
𝑏𝑏1 𝑥𝑥1 capital 0.2151 0.3273 0.2653 0.1540 0.3729 sig 0.1644 -2.23 
𝑏𝑏2 𝑥𝑥2 leakage 0.2584 
 
0.3100 0.2150 0.4050 sig 0.0259 -0.66 
𝑏𝑏3† 𝑥𝑥3 OPEX  0.5264 0.6727 0.4247      
𝑏𝑏11 𝑥𝑥12  -0.5461 -0.1555 -0.1729 -0.3606 -0.0271 sig 0.1347 1.35 
𝑏𝑏22 𝑥𝑥22  -0.7893 
 
-0.1355 -0.3360 0.0181 
 
0.0425 -4.09 
𝑏𝑏33† 𝑥𝑥32  -0.2265  -0.1555  -0.1453       
𝑏𝑏12 𝑥𝑥1𝑥𝑥2  0.5545 
 
0.0816 -0.0430 0.2235 
 
0.0435 3.56 
𝑏𝑏13† 𝑥𝑥1𝑥𝑥3  -0.0084   0.1555   0.0913       
𝑏𝑏23† 𝑥𝑥2𝑥𝑥3   0.2348    0.0540       
𝑝𝑝11 𝑞𝑞1𝑥𝑥1  0.7475 0.1157 -0.0115 -0.2566 0.2133 
 
0.1436 0.33 
𝑝𝑝12 𝑞𝑞1𝑥𝑥2  -0.7009 
 
0.0543 -0.1907 0.3267 
 
0.1587 0.15 
𝑝𝑝13† 𝑞𝑞1𝑥𝑥3  -0.0466  -0.1157  -0.0428       
𝑝𝑝21 𝑞𝑞2𝑥𝑥1  -1.0008 -0.2770 -0.1138 -0.3609 0.1385 
 
0.1519 -0.09 
𝑝𝑝22 𝑞𝑞2𝑥𝑥2  0.9733 
 
0.0287 -0.2315 0.2762 
 
0.1550 0.48 
𝑝𝑝23† 𝑞𝑞2𝑥𝑥3   0.0275   0.2770   0.0851       
𝑝𝑝31 𝑞𝑞3𝑥𝑥1  0.1876 0.0993 0.1005 0.0097 0.1865 sig 0.0546 -0.72 
𝑝𝑝32 𝑞𝑞3𝑥𝑥2  -0.3263 
 
-0.1271 -0.2012 -0.0407 sig 0.0494 -0.85 
𝑝𝑝33† 𝑞𝑞3𝑥𝑥3   0.1386  -0.0993   0.0266       
𝜆𝜆1 𝑡𝑡 trend 0.0128 0.0138 0.0032 -0.0072 0.0132 
 
0.0063 2.81 
𝜆𝜆11 𝑡𝑡2  -0.0024 -0.0008 -0.0000 -0.0034 0.0042 
 
0.0023 -0.19 
𝛾𝛾1 𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞1  0.0331 -0.0126 -0.0049 -0.0172 0.0079 
 
0.0073 0.88 
𝛾𝛾2 𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞2  -0.0151 0.0208 0.0129 -0.0003 0.0252 
 
0.0074 -1.64 
𝛾𝛾3 𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞3  -0.0174 -0.0037 -0.0028 -0.0095 0.0030 
 
0.0076 -0.80 
𝜉𝜉1 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥1  0.0311 0.0142 0.0095 -0.0027 0.0212 
 
0.0077 2.13 
𝜉𝜉2 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥2  -0.0090 
 
-0.0013 -0.0131 0.0110 
 
0.0038 -0.43 
𝜉𝜉3† 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥3  -0.0221  -0.0082       
𝜑𝜑1 𝑧𝑧1average pumping head -0.1255 -0.2257 -0.1618 -0.2851 -0.0365 sig 0.0751 2.16 
𝜑𝜑2 𝑧𝑧2unmetered households % -0.1630 -0.1437 -0.5411 -0.7981 -0.2454 sig 0.1688 0.28 
𝜑𝜑3 𝑧𝑧3main bursts/1,000km -0.1010 -0.0963 -0.1294 -0.2558 -0.0231 sig 0.0734 0.13 
𝜑𝜑4 𝑧𝑧4water quality 0.0263 0.0286 0.0336 -0.1526 0.1998 
 
0.1039 1.90 
𝜑𝜑5 𝑧𝑧5 water and sewerage co. 0.2004 0.0600 0.1278 -0.0321 0.2860 
 
0.0940 0.42 
𝜑𝜑6 𝑧𝑧6impounding reservoirs -0.0988 -0.1370 -0.0877 -0.4143 0.1506 
 
0.1723 0.98 
𝜑𝜑7 𝑧𝑧7  borehole 0.0506 0.0082 -0.0104 -0.1217 0.0919 
 
0.0651 1.93 
ℎ Error precision 
 
24.2415 8.3274 3.1199 15.6474 sig 4.0367 3.18 
𝜇𝜇−1 −ln (𝜏𝜏)   0.0958 0.1347 0.0839 0.2084 sig 0.0389 -3.49 
 Lambda 4.0852        
 Sigma 0.1254        
†The coefficientes for the terms that contains the numeraire term were obtained using the homogeneity condition. 
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Table 3: Summary of Our Main Results, Averages by Year and Regulatory Period 
 
Elasticities 
Time 
Elasticity 
Shadow Price 
per Cubic 
Meter of 
Water  
Efficiency 
 
Inputs Outputs 
 
Capital Leakage Opex Water delivered 
Connected 
Properties Area 
1996 0.2574 0.3162 0.4265 -0.3459 -0.4175 -0.2674 -0.0015 £2.06  
1997 0.2552 0.3193 0.4255 -0.3351 -0.4273 -0.2647 -0.0007 £2.09  
1998 0.2491 0.3209 0.4300 -0.3381 -0.4404 -0.2525 0.0007 £2.22  
1999 0.2447 0.3269 0.4284 -0.3306 -0.4485 -0.2473 0.0015 £2.24  
2000 0.2439 0.3307 0.4254 -0.3417 -0.4401 -0.2420 0.0021 £2.24  
Period 1 0.2503 0.3226 0.4271 -0.3383 -0.4344 -0.2551 0.0004 £2.16 0.8331 
2001 0.2528 0.3103 0.4369 -0.3323 -0.4442 -0.2544 0.0033 £2.01  
2002 0.2575 0.3087 0.4339 -0.3442 -0.4311 -0.2542 0.0036 £1.99  
2003 0.2649 0.3077 0.4274 -0.3453 -0.4242 -0.2557 0.0038 £2.08  
2004 0.2742 0.3093 0.4165 -0.3622 -0.4048 -0.2534 0.0036 £2.30  
2005 0.2758 0.3040 0.4203 -0.3479 -0.4130 -0.2588 0.0044 £2.02  
Period 2 0.2650 0.3080 0.4270 -0.3464 -0.4235 -0.2553 0.0037 £2.08 0.8504 
2006 0.2761 0.2990 0.4249 -0.3447 -0.4132 -0.2624 0.0052 £1.73  
2007 0.2797 0.3003 0.4200 -0.3354 -0.4172 -0.2626 0.0057 £1.78  
2008 0.2818 0.2980 0.4202 -0.3322 -0.4162 -0.2649 0.0063 £1.74  
2009 0.2884 0.2951 0.4165 -0.3308 -0.4190 -0.2630 0.0067 £1.80  
2010 0.2952 0.2892 0.4155 -0.3291 -0.4136 -0.2686 0.0071 £1.70  
Period 3 0.2841 0.2964 0.4195 -0.3345 -0.4158 -0.2643 0.0062 £1.75 0.8399 
Average 0.2653 0.3100 0.4247 -0.3397 -0.4253 -0.2580 0.0032 £2.01 0.8402 
Max 0.4460 0.6042 0.6644 -0.0974 -0.1410 -0.0258 0.0215 £8.78  
Min 0.0895 0.0906 0.1987 -0.5846 -0.7269 -0.5176 -0.0134 £0.22  
WoCs 0.2834 0.3791 0.3375 -0.3493 -0.3698 -0.2423 -0.0022 £2.99 0.8452 
WaSCs 0.2409 0.2170 0.5422 -0.3268 -0.5000 -0.2791 0.0105 £0.69 0.8519 
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Table 4: Shadow Price per  Cubic Meter of  Water by Company and Regulatory Period 
DMU Shadow Prices Efficiencies/Model 1 Efficiencies/Model 0 
96-00 01-05 96-00 96-00 96-00 06-10 96-00 96-00 06-10 
WaScs          
1 
 
£0.63 £0.45  0.8357 0.8166   0.9053   0.8636  
2 £0.69 
  
0.8201    0.9059    
15 
 
£1.68 £1.41  0.7938 0.8184   0.9203   0.9286  
16 £0.62 
  
0.8590    0.9207    
18 £0.39 £0.52 £0.43 0.8594 0.8804 0.9015  0.9073   0.9418   0.9552  
21 £1.82 £1.65 £1.26 0.8968 0.8920 0.8750  0.9626   0.9597   0.9389  
23 £0.61 £0.50 £0.28 0.7766 0.8030 0.8331  0.8605   0.8784   0.8864  
24 £0.64 £0.83 £0.83 0.7847 0.8014 0.8667  0.8707   0.8786   0.9418  
26 £0.45 £0.47 £0.59 0.8868 0.8923 0.9079  0.9303   0.9384   0.9606  
30 £0.29 £0.44 £0.36 0.8879 0.8699 0.8296  0.9647   0.9622   0.9349  
31 £0.35 £0.54 £0.51 0.8707 0.8340 0.8302  0.9238   0.9034   0.9017  
32 
 
£0.55 £0.45  0.8677 0.8771   0.9175   0.9245  
33 £0.47 
  
0.8880    0.9238    
Min £0.29 £0.44 £0.28 0.7766 0.7938 0.8166 0.8605 0.8784 0.8636 
Median £0.54 £0.55 £0.48 0.8651 0.8517 0.8499 0.9223 0.9189 0.9318 
Max £1.82 £1.68 £1.41 0.8968 0.8923 0.9079 0.9647 0.9622 0.9606 
Average £0.63 £0.78 £0.66 0.8530 0.8470 0.8556 0.9170 0.9206 0.9236 
WoCs          
3 £7.24 
  
0.8612   0.9131   
4 £2.07 £2.21 £1.80 0.8832 0.8822 0.8824 0.9504 0.9565 0.9502 
5 £2.47 £3.00 £2.20 0.8856 0.8628 0.8666 0.9302 0.9160 0.8852 
6 £2.03 £2.42 £2.20 0.8039 0.8431 0.8375 0.8829 0.9212 0.9145 
7 £2.83 £3.70 £3.51 0.7257 0.7972 0.8136 0.8303 0.8874 0.8951 
8 £5.32 
  
0.7387   0.8426   
9 £3.79 
  
0.5513   0.7370   
10 £4.29 £5.65 £4.73 0.8861 0.8894 0.9073 0.9352 0.9543 0.9619 
11 £1.62 £1.88 £1.52 0.8207 0.8106 0.7072 0.8882 0.8906 0.8158 
12 £1.12 £1.53 £1.35 0.8646 0.8897 0.8034 0.9506 0.9622 0.9268 
13 £1.12 
  
0.7710   0.8729   
14 £2.04 
  
0.7480   0.9158   
17 £2.78 
  
0.8408   0.9340   
19 £2.15 £2.11 £2.03 0.8304 0.8219 0.8426 0.8727 0.8731 0.8955 
20 £4.73 £4.64 £4.22 0.8574 0.8548 0.8706 0.9436 0.9387 0.9417 
22 £1.56 £1.62 £1.22 0.8982 0.8562 0.8597 0.9224 0.8808 0.8524 
25 £6.34 £7.45 £5.66 0.8707 0.8859 0.8705 0.9559 0.9602 0.9385 
27 
 
£1.76 £1.55  0.8444 0.8485  0.9364 0.9284 
28 £1.43 
  
0.8458   0.9126   
29 £3.26 
  
0.9150   0.9565   
34 £2.44 
  
0.8638   0.9194   
35 
  
£1.02   0.6517   0.8391 
Min £1.12 £1.53 £1.02  0.5513   0.7972   0.6517   0.7370   0.8731   0.8158  
Median £2.46 £2.32 £2.03  0.8516   0.8555   0.8485   0.9176   0.9288   0.9145  
Max £7.24 £7.45 £5.66  0.9150   0.8897   0.9073   0.9565   0.9622   0.9619  
Average £3.03 £3.16 £2.54  0.8231   0.8532   0.8278   0.9033   0.9231   0.9035  
Total          
Min £0.29 £0.44 £0.28 0.5513 0.7938 0.6517 0.7370 0.8731 0.8158 
Median £1.93 £1.67 £1.35 0.8592 0.8555 0.8485 0.9201 0.9207 0.9268 
Max £7.24 £7.45 £5.66 0.9150 0.8923 0.9079 0.9647 0.9622 0.9619 
Average £2.23 £2.08 £1.72  0.8331   0.8504   0.8399   0.9079   0.9220   0.9122  
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Table 5:Price of a Cubic Meter of Water in 2010 Using Information from Ofwat Report vs Shadow Prices 
DMU 
Shadow 
Price 60m3 110m3 160m3 % Leakage 
%o f Unmetered 
households 
1 £0.41 £1.49 £1.37 £1.29 18.44% 40% 
4 £1.83 £1.63 £1.38 £1.29 18.96% 71% 
5 £2.09 £1.39 £1.22 £1.16 14.50% 51% 
6 £2.26 £1.27 £1.06 £0.99 18.93% 44% 
7 £3.47 £1.40 £1.20 £1.12 15.96% 56% 
10 £4.12 £1.85 £1.62 £1.53 18.55% 32% 
15 £0.76 £1.56 £1.33 £1.24 19.16% 75% 
18 £0.39 £1.87 £1.64 £1.56 25.90% 74% 
19 £1.97 £1.06 £0.87 £0.79 15.90% 88% 
20 £4.81 £1.57 £1.37 £1.13 15.39% 70% 
21 £0.99 £1.36 £1.16 £1.09 16.98% 66% 
22 £1.15 £1.34 £1.13 £1.05 23.99% 79% 
23 £0.29 £1.70 £1.52 £1.45 27.19% 69% 
24 £0.77 £2.23 £1.98 £1.89 19.57% 41% 
25 £5.94 £2.03 £1.84 £1.76 16.93% 37% 
26 £0.58 £1.56 £1.37 £1.29 26.02% 74% 
27 £1.63 £1.38 £1.17 £1.09 17.27% 65% 
30 £0.39 £1.72 £1.56 £1.50 23.62% 77% 
31 £0.44 £1.99 £1.87 £1.82 21.49% 60% 
33 £0.41 £1.39 £1.19 £1.11 22.94% 67% 
35 £0.99 £1.57 £1.42 £1.36 17.39% 67% 
Correlation  0.08 0.05 -0.01   
WoCs are in gray color.  
 
 
